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Abstract
In the article of 1965 Are logical truths analytic? Hintikka deals with the
problem of establishing whether the logical truths of first-order logic are
analytic or synthetic. In order to provide an answer to this issue, Hintikka
firstly distinguishes two different notions of analyticity, and then he shows
that the sentences of first-order logic are analytic in one sense, but synthetic
in another. This interesting result clearly illustrates the non-triviality of the
question. In this paper we aim at answering the question Are modal truths
analytic? In order to elaborate a satisfactory answer to this question, we
will follow the strategy of Hintikka and we will exploit some recent results
on the proof theory for modal logic. Finally, our conclusions will shed new
lights on the links between first-order logic and modal logic.
1 Introduction
The main aim of this paper is to answer the following question: are modal
truths analytic? The very same type of question was posed by Hintikka [3]
with respect to first-order logical truths (while, as far as we know, nobody has
ever wonder about the analyticity of modal logic). Hintikka showed that the
answer, contrary to what one might think at the first glance, is far from being
trivial. In order to develop our answer, we will closely tread the same path as
Hintikka.
Hintikka distinguishes three notions of analytic:
(I) analytic truths are sentences that are true by sole virtue of the meaning
of the terms they contain,
(II) analytic truths do not convey any factual information,
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(III) analytic truths can be shown to be true by strictly analytic methods.
Let us get a closer look to these different notions of analyticity. The first no-
tion of analytictiy has to be completely disregarded. Indeed, the attacks raised
by Quine ([11]) towards such notion have clearly shown that it is, as it stands,
unsatisfactory. Moreover it makes all the logical truths trivially analytic, and it
is therefore irrelevant to our purposes. So, let us turn our attention to defini-
tions II and III of analyticity. Following Hintikka, (a certain part of) first-order
logic is analytic in the sense II of analyticity, but synthetic in the sense III of
analyticity. Our goal is to show that modal logic is also synthetic in the sense
III of analiticity. We will not deal with the question of whether modal logic
is analytic in the sense II of analyticity. Such a question can be the subject of
future research.
Let us start our task by analysing the notion III of analyticity.
2 Analytic by means of analytic methods
Let us ask what can be said of the sense of analyticity defined by III. Here it is
advisable to first precisely define the concept of analytical argument-step and
then to extend the definition to the larger concept of argument. The basic idea
of sense III seems to be expressible as follows:
III(a) All that is said by the conclusion of an analytic argument step
is already said in the premise(s)
A conclusion of an analytic argument-step merely repeats what has already
been explicitly stated or simply mentioned in the premise(s). This seems to be
the more standard and common sense of the word analysis. Therefore our defi-
nition III(a) seems to be correct. Although correct, definition III(a) is admittedly
very vague. Hence it is our purpose to make it somewhat clearer. One way of
making it clearer, it is to formalise it. Despite the precision and transparency
that a formalisation gives us, we will not go in this direction. Indeed we aim
at being clear and general at the same time; unluckily a formalisation would
oblige us to choose a precise formalism, and therefore to lose the broader view
on the notion of analyticity. So we have to find another solution. We propose
the following one:
III(b) In the conclusion of an analytic argument step no more ob-
jects are considered together at one and the same time then were
considered together in the premise(s)
In order to clarify the meaning of analytic argument step, we use the notion
of objects and their interrelations. For the conclusion to merely repeat what is
said in the premise(s), the number of objects and their interrelations occurring
in the conclusion must be the same as the number of objects and their interre-
lations occurring in the premise(s). We underline that in [3, p. 180], Hintikka
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proposes a very similar notion of analytic-argument step: the only difference
being that wherever we use the term “object”, he uses the term “individual”.
We think that the term “object” is more general, and thus make definition III(b)
applicable not only to first-order logic, but also to modal logic. In the next
section we will specify what we exactly mean by number of objects and their
interrelations.
We have thus elucidated the notion of analytic-argument step. But our goal
was to define the broader notion of argument. For this, it suffices to generalize
what we have said up to this point. We can claim that a proof of q from p is an-
alytic in sense III(b) if no more objects are considered at any of the intermediate
stages than are already considered either in p or in q. A modal true sentence p
will be said analytic if it can be proved to be true by strictly analytic means, i.e.
by an argument where no more objects are considered together than in p.
Let us conclude this section by relating definition III(b) with Kant’s distinc-
tion between analytic and synthetic (see [4, 5, 6]). In order to explain such a
bound, let us firstly relate the sense III(b) of the term “analytic” to the sense
that this word has traditionally had in geometry. A geometrical argument can
be called analytic in so far as no new construction is carried out in it, i.e. in
so far as no new lines, points circles and their like are introduced during the
argument. On the other hand, a geometrical argument is said to be synthetic if
these new entities are introduced. Let us compare this notion of analytic with
the notion introduced in III(b). It seems enough clear that the former notion
is just a more specific version of the latter notion. Indeed in the notion III(b)
we generally say that in an analytic argument step, no new object should be
introduced passing from the premise to the conclusion; in the geometrical no-
tion, we specify what kind of object ( i.e. point, lines, circles) should not be
introduced passing from the premise to the conclusion.
According to Hintikka [2], Kant’s usage of the term “analytic” and “syn-
thetic” largely follows the geometrical paradigm. Therefore Kant’s usage of
these terms comes pretty close to the sense that these terms have in definition
III(b).
3 First-Order Logic
As we have already said in the introduction, Hintikka deals with the ques-
tion of whether the sentences of first-order logic are analytic in the sense III of
analyticity that we have just explained. Let us dedicate this section to a pre-
sentation of Hintikka’s solution.
First of all, let us introduce the key notion of degree of a sentence. In order
to define the degree of a sentence, we have to introduce the notion of depth of
a sentence. The depth of a sentence A, in symbols d(A), can inductively be
defined in the following way:
d(A) = 0, if A is an atomic sentence or an identity
d(A1 ∧A2) = d(A1 ∨A2) = max ((d(A1), d(A2))
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d(∃xA) = d(∀xA) = d(A) + 1
In intuitive terms, the depth of a sentence is nothing but the maximum
number of quantifiers whose scopes all overlap in it. For instance, we have:
d(P (a, b)) = 0; d(∃xP (x, a)) = d(∃xP (a, x)) = 1; d(∃xP (a, x) ∧ ∃xP (x, a)) =
1; d(∀x(∃yP (x, y) ∨ ∃y∃z(P (y, z) ∧ P (z, x)))) = 3.
Once the notion of depth of a sentence clarified, we can introduce the degree
of a sentence. The degree of a sentence corresponds to the sum of its depth
plus the number of free individual symbols occurring in it (constants or free
variables).
The notion of degree of a sentence will be important in what follows, so
it is worth explaining it carefully. The degree of a sentence serves to identify
the number of objects (in case of first-order logic, the number of individuals)
whose properties and interrelations one considers (or might consider) in that
sentence. Of course this number includes the individuals referred to by the free
individual symbols of the sentence. It also includes all the indefinite individ-
uals introduced by the quantifiers within the scope of which we are moving.
It does not include any other individual. The maximum number of all these
individuals is just the degree of the sentence in question, which is therefore the
maximum number of individuals we are considering together in the sentence.
Recall now definition III(b). In that definition, we used the expression “ob-
jects considered together at one and the same time”. We promised to clarify
this expression. The notion of degree serves this goal. Indeed the degree of a
sentence is nothing but the number of objects considered together at one and
the same time in that sentence.
As we have just said, Hintikka claims that certain sentences of first-order
logic are not analytic in the sense III(b) of analyticity. Now we have all the
means to explain how Hintikka justifies his claim. Let us then consider the
rule of existential instantiation of the natural deduction calculus for first order
logic. Such a rule has the following form:
...
d
∃xPx
P [a/x]
EI
where a is a free individual symbol that should not have been used elsewhere
in the derivation d and P (a/x) is the result of replacing x by a in P (wherever
it is bound to the initial quantifier ∃xPx).
The rule of existential instantiation is a synthetic rule: if we take objects
to be individuals, it increases the number of objects considered together at one
and the same time by adding a new one. Indeed in the ruleEI we pass from the
formula ∃xPx to the formula P [a/x], hence, thanks to the rule EI , we might
pass from the formula ∃xPx to the formula ∃xPx → P [a/x]: while the for-
mula ∃xPx has degree 1, the formula ∃xPx → P [a/x] has degree 2. Therefore
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the rule of existential instantiation is synthetic because it allows to infer a con-
clusion which has a degree higher than that of the premise(s). Therefore the
first-order logic sentences that are provable by using this rule are synthetic be-
cause they cannot be proved by strictly analytic methods. An example of this
type of sentences are the laws of exchanging adjacent quantifiers.
Given this situation, one could naturally ask whether the conclusion that
has just been drawn is not an accidental peculiarity of natural deduction. One
might think that another formalism could allow to prove all the first-order sen-
tences in a purely analytic way. Unluckily it is not so. Let us consider the rule
that eliminates the existential quantifier in tableaux calculi, i.e. the exposition
rule:
∃xPx
|
|
P (x/a)
where a is a constant that has not been used elsewhere in the derivation. Even
in this case, the degree of the conclusion is higher in the degree of the premise.
The same happens in the sequent calculus with the rule that introduces the
existential connective on the left side of the sequent1
P (x/a),M ⇒ N
∃xPx,M ⇒ N
All these rules are synthetic. This is a feature of every complete proof pro-
cedure in quantification theory. Indeed every such proof procedure makes use
of sentences of higher degree than that of the sentences to be proved. This way
Hintikka concludes that certain sentences of first order logic are synthetic in
the sense III(b).
4 Modal Logic
Let us now focus on modal logic. As we have already said our aim is to show
that certain modal logical truths are synthetic in the sense III(b) of analyticity.
In order to draw this conclusion, let us proceed as follows. Let us first of all
remind the reader of an important result that links modal logic to first-order
logic.
Definition 4.1. Let x be a first-order variable. The standard translation STx
taking modal formulas to first-order formulas is defined as follows:
1We take for granted that the reader knows that this rule corresponds to the exposition and the
instantiation rules in tableaux calculi and natural deduction calculi, respectively (for further detail
see, for example, [12]).
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• STx(p) = Px
• STx(⊥) = x 6= x
• STx(¬A) = ¬STx(A)
• STx(A ∨B) = STx(A) ∨ STx(B)
• STx(A) = ∃y(Rxy ∧ STy(A))
where y is a fresh variable (that is, a variable that has not been used so far in
the translation).
It should be clear that this definition makes good sense: it is essentially a
first-order reformulation of the modal satisfaction definition. For any modal
formula A, STx(A) will contain exactly one free variable (namely x); the role of
this free variable is to mark the current state; this use of a free variable makes
it possible for the global notion of first-order satisfaction to mimic the local
notion of modal satisfaction. Furthermore, observe that modalities are trans-
lated as bounded quantifiers, and in particular, quantifiers bounded to act only
on related states; this is the obvious way of mimicking the local action of the
modalities in first-order logic. Finally it is clear from this translation that there
is a strict correspondence between the existential quantifier of first-order logic
and the modal operator  (as there is a strict correspondence between the uni-
versal quantifier and the 2).
Given this correspondence, and taking into account what we have previ-
ously shown for first-order logic through the rule that eliminates the existential
quantifier in natural deduction, let us consider the rule that eliminates the dia-
mond in the natural deduction calculus for modal logic. Unluckily, as far as we
know, it does not exist a sort of standard natural deduction calculus for modal
logic. Therefore we do not have a standard rule for the elimination of the di-
amond operator that we can refer to. The problem lies in the fact that proof
theory for modal logic is still a pretty young enterprise and that the research
has obtained better results in the sequent calculus framework. Let us then have
a look to the rule that introduces the diamond on the left side of the sequent in
a sequent calculus. In this case, we have different rules at our disposal. Each
rule belongs to a different calculus, and each calculus for modal logic is a differ-
ent generalisation of the standard sequent calculus. The latest extension of the
Gentzen sequent calculus is the tree-hypersequent method (see [10]). In what
follows, we will mainly deal with this formalism since it is the best suited for
our purpose, but we will also make reference to the other formalisms.
Let us try to explain the tree-hypersequent method in the most general and
least formal possible way (for a more accurate and formal description see [10]).
First of all, in the tree-hypersequent method, instead of dealing with one se-
quent a time (as is the case in the classical sequent calculus), i.e. with objects of
the form
M ⇒ N
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where M and N are multisets of formulas, we deal with n sequents a time.
These n sequents, that are standardly called hypersequents, are arranged in such
a way that they can form a tree; hence they are named tree-hypersequents There
exists a semantic way to look at tree-hypersequents: they can be seen as tree-
frames of Kripke-semantics, where each sequent represents a world of the tree-
frame. The rule that introduces the diamond on the left side of the sequent in
the tree-hypersequent setting is the following one:
G[M ⇒ N/⇒ A]
G[M ⇒ N, A] L
The rule L should be read (bottom-up) in the following way: in a tree-frame
G, if there is a world x (denoted by the sequent M ⇒ N, A) that contains
the formula A, then we can construct a new world y (denoted by the sequent
⇒ A) such that xRy (the relation xRy is denoted by the slash) and y contains
the formula A. What can easily be noticed by looking at the rule L is that in
the passage from the premise to the conclusion (reading the rule bottom-up),
we add some new structure, namely a slash and a new sequent. Let us further
examine what this addition of structure involves.
From the standard translation of Definition 4.1., we know that there exists
a strict link between the possible words of modal logic and the individuals of
first order logic. Both are the objects that the first-order and modal sentences
talk about. In first-order logic, in order to be able to identify these objects and
their interrelations, we have introduced the notion of degree. We have to in-
troduce a similar notion for modal logic. We do it by defining the concept
of mdegree in the following way. The mdegree of a sentence A, in symbols
md(A), is the number of sequents occurring in the longest branch of a tree-
hypersequent. A brief reflection will allow the reader to realise that the notion
of mdegree of a modal sentence tries to capture the same idea that is at the
base of the notion of degree i.e. that of counting the number of objects and
their interrelations (in the modal case, related worlds) that are represented by
a sentence.
Thanks to this notion of mdegree, we are now able to check whether the
rule L is a synthetic rule, according to definition III(b). Indeed it is: the rule
L allows us to infer, reading it bottom-up, a conclusion with a mdegree higher
than the premise. We can then draw the conclusion that the modal truths that
are provable by means of this rule are synthetic in the sense III(b) of the dis-
tinction between analytic and synthetic sentences.
Let us then briefly sum up what has been said up to now. Between modal
logic and first order logic there is an evident parallelism that can even be for-
malised by a rigorous definition. Sentences of modal logic talk about worlds
and their interrelations, as sentences of first-order logic talks about individuals
and their interrelations. In the case of first-order logic, the number of objects
and their interrelations expressed by a sentence is calculated by summing up
the free individuals occurring in the sentence plus the number of quantifiers
whose scope all overlay in the sentence. In the case of modal logic, thanks to
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the tree-hypersequent method, the number of objects and their interrelations
expressed by a sentence is much more easily calculated by counting the num-
ber of sequents occurring in a the longest branch of a tree-hypersequent. In the
rule of existential instantiation, as well as in the rule L, the number of objects
considered together at one and the same time increases from the premise to
the conclusion. This fact allows us to claim that both rules are synthetic, and
that the sentences of first-order logic and modal logic, respectively proved by
means of the rule of instantiation and the rule L, are synthetic too according
to definition III(b).
Let us conclude this section by briefly seeing other formalisms where we
have a rule that introduces the diamond on the left side of the sequent. For
instance, let us consider the display method, as well as the multiple sequent
method (for an accurate description of these two generalisations of the sequent
calculus see [10] and [13]). In both these cases we have the following rules:
A⇒ •N
A⇒ N L∗
A,M⇒ N
A⇒ N L∗∗
where the symbol • is the characteristic structural connective of the display
method, while ⇒ is the characteristic structural connective of the multiple se-
quent method. Without dwelling on the interpretations of the two new struc-
tural connectives of the display method and the multiple sequent method,
which would lead us too far away from our principal goal, it is easy to no-
tice that in the two rules L∗ and L ∗ ∗we can observe the same phenomenon
that we have underlined in the rule L, i.e. a new structural element appear-
ing. This new structural element could be taken as the new introduced object
that renders the rules concerning the diamond all synthetic. Hence these exam-
ples clearly show that the fact that certain modal sentences are synthetic do not
depend on a particular formalism,2 but it is, on the contrary, an unavoidable
feature of modal logic, as it was the case for first-order logic.
5 First-Order Logic and Modal Logic
We have thus shown that certain modal sentences are synthetic because prov-
able by synthetic means. Note that such a conclusion could also serve to shed
new lights on the relations between first-order logic and modal logic. Let us
first of all remind the reader the following theorem, which is based on Defini-
tion 4.1
Theorem 5.1. Let A be a modal formula, then:
for all modelsM,M |= A if, and only if,M |= ∀xSTx(A)
2Note that there also exist standard sequent calculi for modal logic, e.g. [8] and [9]. In these
calculi, the rule that introduces the diamond on the left side of the sequent is analytic, i.e. it does
not introduce any new structure. On the other hand, in these calculi the cut-rule, the non analytic
rule par excellence, is not eliminable, therefore the lack of analyticity is there anyway.
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In other more informal words, Theorem 5.1 states that modal formulas are
equivalent to first order formulas in one free variable. On purely syntactic
grounds it is obvious that the standard translation is not surjective (standard
translations of modal formulas contain only bounded quantifiers). The ques-
tion is then: could every first-order formula (in the appropriate correspondence
language) be equivalent to the translation of a modal formula? No. This is very
easy to see: whereas modal formulas are invariant under bisimulations, first-
order formulas need not be; thus any first-order formula which is not invariant
under bisimulations cannot be equivalent to the translation of a modal formula
(for further details see [1]). This means that modal logic is a subset of first-order
logic, under an adequate translation. Given this situation, it could have been
that the first-order formulas that we have classified as synthetic were exactly
the first-order formulas not translatable in modal logic. In that case modal
logic would have been the analytic subset of first-order logic. In this paper
we have on the contrary shown that certain modal formulas are synthetic and
therefore that the modal subset of first-order logic contains (at least) some of
the synthetic first-order formulas.
6 Kant and the analytic-synthetic distinction
In Section 2 we have explained the distinction between analytic and synthetic
from a geometrical, and more generally, from a mathematical point of view. We
have also briefly said that Kant was very close to this kind of distinction and
therefore to the sense of analyticity explicitly stated in III(b). In this Section we
will further examine these issues in the light of the conclusions that we have
obtained in Section 4.
Let us go back to Euclid and Aristotle. A reason for uniting these two il-
lustrious thinkers lies in the fact that they both used the word, echtesis, for
denoting two procedures that seem, at the first sight, pretty different. On the
one hand, we can call echtesis, or exposition, the part of an Euclid’s theorem
where a new figure is introduced or drawn for the first time. On the other hand,
we can call echtesis, or exposition, a procedure, used in syllogistic theory, that
pretty much resembles to the rule of existential instantiation (for further and
more precise references see [7]). So we have (i) a geometrical exposition, (ii) a
syllogistic exposition, and (iii) an inferential exposition represented by the rule
that eliminates the existential quantifier in first-order logic. The crucial com-
mon point of these steps is that they all introduce a new element. As we have
seen in the last section, even in modal logic we have a similar situation. When
it come to the diamond operator, we introduce in the derivation some structure
that was not present in the premise(s). What Kant would have thought of these
four different procedures? As it has been suggested in [2], Kant would have
probably indicated them as synthetic procedures. Indeed Kant seems to claim
that mathematical truths are synthetic because they are based on the use of con-
structions. But construction is exactly what characterise (i)-(iii) plus the modal
rule L. In the rule L, when we pass from the conclusion to the premise, we
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literally construct a new world-sequent linked to the others by a relation-slash.
In (ii) and (iii) the construction is in terms of introduction or “exhibition” of an
individual idea to represent a general concept. In (i) the construction is done
by drawing a new figure. So for Kant these fours procedures would have been
perfect examples of synthetic modes of reasoning in mathematics. In particular
(iii) and L would have led him to agree with us that certain first-order logic
sentences, as well as certain modal sentences are synthetic because provable by
synthetic means.
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